A party cannot by his own conduct confer jurisdiction on a court

This is the html version of the file http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2001/jun/000847.PDF.
G o o g l e automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.
To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:DQzl181BCn4J:www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2001/jun/000847.PDF+texas+creation+of+district+jurisdiction&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=29&gl=us&client=firefox-a

Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content.
These search terms have been highlighted: texas creation district jurisdiction
Page 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
444444444444
N
O
. 00-0847
444444444444
W
ILMER
-H
UTCHINS
I
NDEPENDENT
S
CHOOL
D
ISTRICT
, P
ETITIONER
v.
J
OYCE
E. SULLIVAN
, RESPONDENT
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
O
N

PETITION FOR
REVIEW FROM THE
C
OURT OF
A
PPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH
DISTRICT OF
TEXAS
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
PER CURIAM
The issue here is whether the trial court has jurisdiction over this suit for retaliatory discharge
despite the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies whenthe defendant did not tell her such
remedies existed. The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court
of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that jurisdiction must be determined solely on the plaintiff’s
pleadings. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000). We agree with the trial court.
Joyce Sullivan received workers’ compensation benefits for an injury she sustained while working
as a custodian for the Wilmer-Hutchins Independent School District. Ten months later, when her physician
released her to return to work, the District told her that she had been terminated as part of a reduction in
personnel for budget reasons. Believing that she had been terminated for filing a compensation claim, she
contacted the District’s attorney, who told Sullivan that she could not help her. The attorney did not inform
Page 2
2
Sullivan of the District’s grievance procedures or suggest that she seek legal counsel.
Sullivan sued the District for retaliatory discharge. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction on
the ground that Sullivan had not exhausted her administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the plea
and dismissedthe case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Sullivan’s pleading that
she had exhausted her administrative remedies was conclusive, despite unchallenged evidence to the
contrary, absent an allegation by the District that the pleading was fraudulentlymade to confer jurisdiction
on the court when none existed. ___ S.W.3d at ___.
The court of appeals based its holding on its prior decision in Bland Independent School District
v. Blue, 989 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999), which we have since reversed, 34 S.W.3d 547
(Tex. 2000). Sullivan concedes,as she must,that the court of appeals’ opinion conflicts with our decision
in BlandISD, but she contends that the court of appeals’ decision to reverse the dismis salofthe case was
correct.
Sullivan admits that she did not exhaust her administrative remedies and acknowledges that
exhaustion of remedies is a prerequisite to the trial court’s jurisdiction ina case like this involving disputed
fact issues. See Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex.
1992); Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Diserens, 188 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. 1945). But she argues that
the District should be estopped from asserting a lack of jurisdiction by its attorney’s conduct.
Asa general rule,a court cannot acquire subject-matter jurisdiction by estoppel. Nevitt v. Wilson,
285 S.W. 1079, 1084 (Tex. 1926); see also Southern SuretyCo. v. Inabnit, 24 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.
Comm’n App. 1930, opinion adopted) (holding that an agency may not acquirejurisdiction by estoppel).
Page 3
3
The rule hasbeen applied in three cases involving circumstances very similar to those in the present case.
InDanielv.DallasIndependent School District, 351 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.—ElPaso1961,writref’d
n.r.e.),a school custodian alleged that he had been wrongfully terminated because of his membership in a
union. The plaintiff argued that the school district was estopped to assert a lack of jurisdiction for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies because the school board and superintendent had told him after his
termination that“there was nothing more for him to do, and that as far as they were concerned the matter
was concluded”. Id. at 358. The court rejected the argument, stating that “jurisdiction of a court is so
important and essential that it has long been held that it cannot be conferred by estoppel. Itis a statutory
creation or enactment, and cannot be waived or conferred by consent or estoppel . . . .” Id. at 359.
InWashington v. Tyler Independent School District,932S.W.2d686(Tex.App.—Tyler1996,
no writ), the plaintiff alleged that the school district had terminated herforseeking compensation benefits.
She argued that the district was estopped to assert a lack of jurisdiction forfailureto exhaust administrative
remedies because its representatives had failed to advise her of this prerequisite to filing suit. Id. at 689.
Citing Daniel, the court concluded that even if the plaintiff could prove facts amounting to estoppel,
jurisdiction could not thereby be conferred on the trial court. Id. at 690.
In Janik v. Lamar Consolidated Independent School District, 961 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.—
Houston[1stDist.]1997, pet. denied),the plaintiff alleged that she had been terminated for discriminatory
reasons. She claimed that the district had never told her of the administrative procedures that were
prerequisite to suit. Id. at 324. Citing Washington, the court held that the trial could not acquire
jurisdiction by estoppel. Id.
Page 4
4
Sullivandoes not attempt to distinguish Daniel,Washington,and Janik but argues simply thatthey
were wrongly decided. We disagree. A party cannot by his own conduct confer jurisdiction on a court
when none exists otherwise. Even if the District misled Sullivan as she claims, her failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies is fatal to her action.
Accordingly, the Court grants the District’s petition for review and,without hearing oral argument,
reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and dismisses the case for want of jurisdiction. T
EX
. R. A
PP
.
P. 59.1.
Opinion delivered: June 21, 2001